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R&D Subsidy in Japanese SMEs 
: A Preliminary Analysis* 
Tadahisa Koga 
In this paper, the actual situation of R&D subsidy in 
Japanese SMEs is reported. We examine what type of firm 
awards R&D subsidies and to what industries R&D subsidies 
are mainly allocated. Simple analysis finds no significant 
difference in the level of R&D between subsidized firms and 
non-subsidized firms. This suggests that endogeneuity 
problems are not so serious in our samples. The allocation of 
subsidy in industries might be influenced by appropriability 
condition and technological opportunity. We find that R&D 
subsidy tends to be distributed to industries where 
appropriability is relatively effective, or where technological 
opportunity is relatively abundant. 
Keywords: NIKKEi Almanac of Venture Business, spillover, 
Mean comparison test, Japanese national innovation survey 
1. Introduction 
New knowledge and technology, which are gained through a firm's 
R&D activities, bring positive benefits to other producers and 
consumers in the economy via spillover. According to Jaffe (2003), 
there are three kinds of spillover, that is, knowledge spillover, market 
spillover, and network spillover. Each type of spillover causes a 
discrepancy between the social rate of return and the private rate of 
return to a firm's R&D. 
The existence of knowledge and market spillovers has already 
been identified by empirical studies which have also shown that the 
absolute level of these spillovers is quite high. For example, Griliches 
(1998) found evidence that the private rate of return for industrial R&D 
* Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. 
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ranges from 9 to 69 %, whereas the social rate of return is from 10 to 
160%. Thus far, we are aware of empirical studies in which the 
combined effects of knowledge and market spillovers have been 
measured. If we consider these spillovers simultaneously, we expect 
to find a greater gap between the social rate of return and the private 
rate of return for industrial R&D1. 
These gaps may be partly filled by strengthening the appropriability 
conditions through patent systems. However, as Levin et al. (1987) 
suggested, a patent system does not always work in practice as it 
does in theory. An appropriability condition ensured by a patent 
system is not perfect, partly because many patents can be 
circumvented and partly because a patent needs stringent legal 
enforcement to prove that it is valid or that it is being infringed乞R&D
subsidy is another policy instrument which aims to correct such 
market failures and raise industrial R&D to socially optimal levels. 
The above discussion regarding the expectation that subsidy 
would promote corporate R&D implicitly assumes the complementarity 
of subsidy to firm R&D. In the real word, however, subsidy sometimes 
replaces corporate R&D. In previous studies, at least two instances 
where subsidy may crowd out private R&D have been pointed out. 
The first instance is related to the funding process, and the second, to 
the inelastic supply of researchers in the labor market3. 
Since subsidies are financed by tax payers'money, in the funding 
process, public funds tend to be awarded to projects with a high 
probability of success or projects whose performance is easy to 
assess ex post facto. However, these kinds of projects can often be 
financed by the firms'own money and do not need public support. In 
such a case, the government is simply supporting R&D projects that 
could actually be conducted without public funds. In other words, 
subsidy substitutes for self-financed R&D. 
Usually, firms must hire additional researchers when they launch 
new R&D projects. However, in an environment where the supply of 
1 Jaffe (2003) 
2 Cohen et al. (2000, 2002) 
3 For example, Busan (2000), David et al. (1999), David and Hall (2000), Gonzalez et al. (2004), Irwin and 
Kienow (1996}, Lach (2002), Lichtenberg (1984, 1987, 1988), Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996), and Wallsten 
(2000). 
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researchers is inelastic, it is difficult for firms to recruit additional 
researchers from the labor market. Thus, firms are forced to re-
allocate their existing researchers from in-house R&D to subsidy 
projects. This means that a firm must discontinue their ongoing 
projects in order to carry out the publicly funded R&D projects. In this 
case, new projects or subsidy projects crowd out in-house R&D4. 
The literature suggests that, in theory, any publicly funded R&D 
and private R&D can be either complementary or substitutive. Hence, 
previous studies have focused on clarifying these relationships 
empirically. The relationship between the subsidy and private R&D 
has been examined on the basis of various levels of data, such as a 
national level, industry level, or firm level5. Almost half of the U.S. 
studies indicate complementarity, between the two types of funding, 
whereas only two studies indicate it in other countries. In particular, 
five of twelve U.S studies, which are conducted based on firm level 
data, suggest complementarity互
As the previous studies show, the results of empirical analyses are 
also diversified. In addition to simply examining substitutability or 
complementarity, recent empirical studies have involved attempts to 
investigate determinants of subsides more closely. For example, 
Buson (2000) considered what type of firms participate in R&D 
subsidy programs. Gonzalez et al. (2004) showed that R&D subsidy 
not only affects the level of R&D expenditures, but also the decision of 
whether a firm conducts R&D or not. 
There have not been enough studies on the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies in Japanese small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In 
addition, we do not understand what kind of firms receive subsides, or 
even to what industries R&D subsidies are allocated. Thus, the 
purpose of this paper is to summarize the actual situation of R&D 
subsidies in Japanese SMEs through a simple analysis. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section is a briefly 
explanation of the characteristics of the data on which our analysis is 
based. Then, we summarize what type of firm is awarded R&D 
4 Jaffe (2003) suggested that the government must fund projects that have a high social rate of return, and 
that there is a low probability that public funds are displacing private funds. 
5 David et al. (1999) 
6 See for example Lichtenberg (1984) and Wallsten (2000). 
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subsidies, taking into account endogeneuity problems. In the section 
three, we consider to what industries R&D subsides are allocated. 
Here, our interests are devoted to examining whether R&D subsidies 
are allocated to the industries that have strong appropriability regimes, 
or abundant technological opportunities. The final section concludes 
our discussions and notes future areas of research. 
2. Subsidy and firm characteristics 
2.1. Data 
In this section, we briefly explain the source of data and how the 
sample firms are selected. Our 2,034 sample firms are collected from 
various volumes of NIKKEi Almanac of Venture Business (hereinafter 
Almanac) published by Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha. 
Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha conducts a questionnaire survey to 
approximately 5,000 Japanese SMEs every year. Almanac reports the 
results of this survey. Almanac is the only publicly available source of 
information on R&D expenditures in Japanese SMEs. 
The target of this survey is firms that (1) do not go public, (2) have 
unique technologies or know-how, (3) have shown a high growth rate 
of sales in recent years, (4) are relatively immature, or, have started 
new businesses recently even if they are mature. The number of 
respondents to this survey differs every year, and, on annual average, 
nearly 2,000 firms respond to this survey each year. This means that 
the respondents are not necessarily the same every year. 
Our sample firms are the firms that report their R&D expenditures 
some of the observed years. Firms that show their R&D expenditures 
as zero are also included. In other words, we exclude from our 
samples, the firms which do not respond to the question concerning 
R&D expenditures in Almanac. 
Our 2,034 sample firms are collected from various industries. 
Among them, the 1,322 manufacturing firms are classified into the 
following industries. food (96 firms:4. 7%), textile (43:2.1 %), wood 
products/paper (23:1.1 %), chemical/drugs (92:4.5%), glass/ceramic 
(30:1.5%), iron/no-ferrous metals/fabricated metals (99:4.9%), general 
machinery (168:8.3%), electrical machinery (316: 15.5%), 
transportation equipment (46:2.3%), precision instruments (123:6.0%), 
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printing (30: 1.5%), and miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
(256:12.6%). On the other hand, the 712 non manufacturing firms are 
in housing/construction (75:3. 7%), information service (61 :3.0%), 
software (250: 12.3%), retailing (151 :7 .4%), services/others 
(175:8.6%). The percentage in parenthesis indicates the ratio of firms 
in each industry to al sample firms. 
Some firms belong to a different industry in different years. For 
example, one firm was categorized under electrical machinery 
industry in Almanac 2003 and information service industry in Almanac 
2004. In this case, we followed the industrial classification of the 
newest Almanac. Furthermore, some firms change their names or are 
acquired by other firms during the periods under consideration. In 
such cases, we confirmed the identity of these firms by checking their 
addresses and the names of their chief executive officers listed in 
these Almanacs. 
Almanacs show both actual and scheduled values of R&D 
expenditures. We revised scheduled values when the later volumes of 
Almanacs provided information on actual values. This means that al 
data on R&D in 2003 are scheduled values. Table 1 shows the 
number of R&D performing and non performing firms in our samples. 
Table 2 displays the number of stable performers and occasional 
performers. Stable firms are defined as the firms reporting non-zero 
R&D expenditures every observed year, and occasional performers 
are the firms reporting R&D some of the observed years7. 
Table 1 Sample Firms 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999-2003 
R&D Performers (1> 935 1,221 1,513 1,353 1,094 1,639 
Non R&D Performers <2> 242 305 415 500 373 395 
Total Samples 1,177 1,526 1,928 1,853 1,467 2,034 
<1> Firms reporting non-zero R&D expenditures 
<2> Firms reporting zero R&D expenditures 
7 Gonzalez et al. (2004) 
Table 2 R&D Performers 
Industries Stable Performers<1> 
Al 586 
Manufacturing 467 
Food 27 
Textile 17 
Wood products/Paper 4 
Chemical/Drugs 39 
Glass/Ceramic 11 
Iron/No-ferrous metals/Fabricated metals 28 
General machinery 67 
日ectricalmachinery 118 
Transportation equipment 7 
Precision instruments 57 
Printing 8 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 84 
119 
Housing/Construction 15 
Information service 8 
Software 48 
Retailing 21 
Services/Others 27 
<1> Firms reporting non zero R&D expenditures every observed year 
<2> Firms reporting R&D expenditures some of the observed years 
Occasional Periormers(2l 
1,053 
703 
63 
6 
13 
46 
15 
54 
85 
173 
33 
55 
12 
148 
350 
32 
38 
161 
49 
70 
~ 
Al Performers 
1,639 
1,170 
90 
23 
17 
85 
26 
82 
152 
291 
40 
112 
20 
232 
469 
47 
46 
209 
70 
97 
69 
Almanacs report the name, year, and amounts of subsidies/public 
loans which were awarded to the firms. Here we concentrate on R&D-
related subsides granted by national or local governments, or 
government-affiliated institutions. In a strict sense, it may be 
necessary to distinguish subsidies from guarantee debt or public 
loans provided by government-affiliated financial institutions. 
Therefore, we include, in our samples, guarantee debts and public 
loans which are clearly related to R&D activity. 
Some data on R&D are considered to be incorrect. In such cases, 
we corrected only those for which we obtained additional information 
on the data concerned. We removed, from our samples, the data that 
do not include any information on the name and the amount of 
subsidy. Table 3 shows the number of R&D subsidies in a time series. 
2.2. Subsidy and endogeneuity 
Summary statistics for subsidized and non subsidized firms are 
shown in table 4. According to the statistics, sales and ordinary profits 
are higher in non-subsidized firms than in subsidized firms. On the 
other hand, there might not be any significant differences in R&D 
expenditures between two groups. 
Table5-1 shows the results of the mean comparison test we 
conducted on al R&D performing firms. As clearly evident from this 
table, a considerable disparity in the number of samples between the 
two groups exists: 1,328 samples in the group of non-subsidized firms 
as opposed to only 311 samples in the group of subsidized firms. 
To eliminate this problem, we attempted to select 311 non 
subsidized firms in two manners. Random sampling is the first method 
to select firms. We continued choosing firms randomly among 1,328 
non-subsidized firms until we selected 311 firms. Then, we compared 
subsidized firms with non-subsidized firms. Table 5-2 shows the 
results of mean comparison test in this case. 
The second method is to make up a pair of companies that are 
similar in the age of the firm8. We did so by selecting one from 
subsidized and the other from non-subsidized firms. We eventually 
created a total of 311 pairs, each consisting of a subsidized firm and 
8 We use the foundation year to determine the age of the firm 
Table 3 R&D Subsides 
??
(Million yen) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Total numbers of R&D subsidies 
Total amounts of subsidies 
33 40 61 67 70 48 
1,155 1,051 1,600 2,567 3,924 1,803 
32 
646 
14 365 
274 13,020 
Table 4 Summary Statistics 
(Million yen) 
No. of OBS Mean Minimum Maximum 
Al R&D Performers 
Sales 7,533 2,981 1 69,302 
Ordinary profits 6,846 121 -1,889 9,933 
R&D expenditures 6,442 63 ゜ 2,800 Subsidized Firms (311 firms) 
Sales 1,459 1,809 3 27,453 
Ordinary profits 1,322 53 -1,292 1,728 
R&D expenditures 1,263 62 ゜ 800 Non-Subsidized Firms (1328 firms) 
Sales 6,074 3,262 1 69,302 
Ordinary profits 5,524 138 -1,889 9,933 
R&D expenditures 5,179 63 ゜ 2,800 Non R&D Performers (395 firms) 
Sales 1,742 3,844 1 109,309 
Ordinary profits 1,604 103 -522 2,996 
Table 5-1 Mean Comparison Test (1) 
Subsidized Firms (311 firms) Non-subsidized Firms (1328 firms) Test Statistics (t values) 
Sales 
Ordinary profits 
R&D expenditures 
1,809 
53 
62 
3,262 
138 
63 
-13.49*** 
-11.74*** 
-0.50 
**** shows statistical significance at 1 percent level. 
Table 5-2 Mean Comparison Test (2) 
Subsidized Firms (311 firms) Non-subsidized Firms (311 firms) Test Statistics (t values) 
Sales 
Ordinary profits 
R&D expenditures 
1,809 
53 
62 
3,246 
152 
58 
-8.94*** 
-5.82*** 
0.70 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level. 
Table 5-3 Mean Comparison Test (3) 
Subsidized Firms (311 firms) Non-subsidized Firms (31 firms) Test Statistics (t values) 
Sales 
Ordinary profits 
R&D expenditures 
1,809 
53 
62 
2,859 
128 
61 
-7.08*** 
-7.23*** 
0.12 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent level 
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its non-subsidized counterpart. The results of the mean comparison 
test conducted on these pairs are shown in table 5-3. 
Table 5-2 and table 5-3 show almost the same results as table 5-1. 
Subsidized firms are less profitable than non-subsidized firms. The 
level of R&D does not differ in two groups. That is, we do not find any 
evidence that R&D subsides tends to be awarded to R&D intensive 
firms or more profitable firms. These results imply that funding process 
does not suffer from serious endogeneuity problems. We should 
examine this problem more closely through econometric analysis in 
the future. 
3. Subsidy and industry characteristics 
3.1. Subsidy and appropriability 
Here we discuss how industrial characteristics influence the 
allocation of R&D subsidies. We focus on such industrial 
characteristics as appropriability and technological opportunity. 
Since the monumental works by Schumpeter, numerous empirical 
studies have been conducted, in which the importance of firm size 
and market structure as determinants governing industrial R&D were 
commonly emphasized. However, their estimated results are diverse, 
and do not give clear conclusions on the relationship among firm size, 
market structure and the level of industrial R&D. Furthermore, we 
have gradually recognized that firm size and market structure are also 
affected by the level of industrial R&D; that is, these two variables are 
endogenous. Considering these findings, recent studies have been 
aimed at exploring more fundamental determinants such as growth in 
demand, the appropriability condition, and technological opportunities9. 
The appropriability condition means the degree to which an 
inventor monopolizes the economic benefits from a new technology or 
new knowledge. If the appropriability condition is strengthened, 
inventors have significant incentive to pursue R&D. Consequently, 
research productivity might be improved. The technological 
opportunity reflects external information that is useful for generating 
new ideas and solving problems in R&D. If the technological 
9 For more details, see Cohen (195) 
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opportunity increases, research activity might become more efficient直
As the literature shows, the appropriability condition and 
technological opportunity are important determinants of innovation in 
firmsりTheliterature also suggests that these two determinants have 
some influence on the relationship between R&D and subsidy. Thus, 
we examine the relationship among subsidy, appropriability and 
technological opportunity. Audretsch et al. (2002) and Feldman et al. 
(2002) give us some hints for considering how subsidy is affected by 
appropriability condition. 
Audretsch et al. (2002) and Feldman et al. (2002) classified the 
types of R&D projects from two perspectives -private rate of return 
and social rate of return -and discussed what types of public support 
are desirable for each type of project. They assumed three types of 
R&D projects, A, B, and C (see Figure 1). These projects are assumed 
to yield the same social rates of return that exceed. the social hurdle 
rate. This suggests that we should conduct al three projects from the 
aspect of social welfare. However, they differ in terms of the private 
rates of return. Project A has a private rate of return which is above 
the private hurdle rate. In project B, the private rate of return is slightly 
below the private hurdle rate, while in project C, it is considerably 
below the private hurdle rate. 
Firms are motivated to conduct project A because its private rate of 
return exceeds the private hurdle rate. Therefore, we need not support 
such projects with public money. Project B might be conducted by 
firms because the・gap between the social rate of return and the 
private rate of return is not large; however, the problem which project 
B faces is how to fil the gap between the private rate of return and the 
private hurdle rate. Taxation might be suitable for supporting project B, 
because we can reduce the private hurdle rate through R&D tax 
credits. However, firms do not have sufficiently strong incentives to 
conduct project C. 
10 Klevorick et al.(1995) 
11 Cohen et al. (1987) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) discuss the relation between appropriability, 
technological opportunity and R&D intensity, on the basis of the U.S. data. 
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Gap between Social and Private Rate of Return to R&D Projects 
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Private Rate of Return 
Figure 1 
(Source) Feldman, M. P., Link, A. N., and Siegel, D., The Economics of Science 
and Technology: Figure 6.1 (p.50) 
This is because project C generates large spillovers and its private 
rate of return is below the private hurdle rate. Subsidy might be a 
suitable means of supporting such projects. 
The above discussion implies that subsidy should be awarded to 
R&D projects with weak appropriability. Since R&D with weak 
appropriability (large spillover) is expected to generate additional 
knowledge or to promote further R&D, such R&D would consequently 
improve the overall research productivity. Thus we could infer that 
subsidy would be effective in a firm in which appropriability is relatively 
weak. Here we conffrm whether subsidy is more effective in a firm 
with weak appropriability than in a firm with strong appropriability. 
We construct indicators of appropriability and technological 
opportunity based on ljichi et al. (2004), who reported the results of 
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the questionnaire survey (Japanese National Innovation Survey) 
conducted in 2003 by the National Institute of Science and Technology 
Policy. 
In the questionnaires sent out to firms, we asked the firms to 
evaluate the degree of nine types of appropriability according to the 
three-grade system. Under this grading system, each firm was given a 
choice of "high", "medium", or "low." Here, "high" stands for a high 
degree of appropriability of, for example, patent protection, whereas 
"low" means a low degree of appropriability of that legal device. 
We classified the results of the questionnaires by industry. This 
report thus shows the percentage of firms in a given industry that 
selected "high", as well as that of the firms that chose "medium" or 
"low" to・express the degree of each type of appropriability. 
Appropriability includes (1) protection by patent, (2) protection by 
design registration, (3) protection by trademarks, (4) protection by 
copyrights, (5) trade secret, (6) complexity of design, (7) advantage of 
lead time on competitors, (8) retention and management of production 
equipment and manufacturing know-how for products, and (9) 
retention and management of delivery system and distribution network 
for products. 
We derive the appropriability condition of an industry in the 
following manner12. First, we award 5 points to a "high" degree of 
effectiveness, 3 points to "medium", and 1 point to "low", respectively. 
Next, we calculate the average score of each type of appropriability璽
The mean score is computed by the number of points times the 
percentage of respondent firms. Then, we obtain both the mean and 
the maximum values of the average scores for each of the nine types 
descried above. These two values are defined as appropriability 
conditions in an industry. 
Table 6 shows the numbers and the amounts of R&D subsidies in 
each industry. Here, AP (Mean) and AP (Maximum) denote mean and 
maximum values in effectiveness of nine types of appropriability, 
respectively. 
According to table 6, R&D subsidies tend to be allocated mainly to 
such industries as electrical machinery (85 subsidies), general 
12 Goto and Nagata (1997), and Goto et al. (2002) 
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machinery (41), miscellaneous manufacturing (41), software (41), 
precision instruments (35), and chemical/drug industries (24). The 
same tendency is observed in the amount of R&D subsidies. In these 
industries, the indicators for the appropriability condition show 
relatively large values. For example, the maximum value of 
appropriability is 3.58 in electrical mach!nery, 2.18 in general 
machinery, 2.68 in miscellaneous manufacturing, 2.38 in software, 2.49 
in precision instruments, and 3.09 in chemical/drug industries. 
As we discussed earlier, greater effectiveness of the appropriability 
condition implies less spillover. Thus R&D subsidy might be distributed 
to the industry with relatively few spillovers. Indeed, we need more 
precise analyses in order to ascertain that the allocation of R&D 
subsidy is positively correlated with the effectiveness of appropriability 
conditions. Econometric analysis is a subject of future research. 
3.2. Subsidy and technological opportunity 
We consider how the allocation of R&D subsides is affected by the 
other industrial characteristic, technological opportunity. As Audretsch 
et al. (2002) argue, subsidy might be a suitable means of supporting 
R&D projects which retain the potential to generate large spillovers. 
We hypothesize that the scale of spillovers might increase with the 
extent of technological opportunities. The main interest here is to 
confirm whether subsidies are allocated to industries which are 
abundant in technological opportunity. 
ljichi et al. (2004) also mention the sources of the information 
needed by the firms to suggest new innovation projects. The sources 
of information are (1) R&D department of the firms, (2) production, 
manufacture, or maintenance department of the firms, (3) marketing 
department of the firms, (4) other department of the firms, (5) other 
enterprises within the firms'group, (6) suppliers of equipment, 
materials, parts (components) or software, (7) clients (including 
distributors) or customers, (8) competitors and other enterprises from 
the same industry, (9) consultants, (10) commercial laboratories/R&D 
enterprises/suppliers of R&D support service, (11) universities or other 
higher educational institutes, (12) government or private non profit 
research institutes, (13) professional conferences or meetings, (14) 
professional journals or academic journals, and (15) trade fairs or 
Table 6 R&D Subsidy and Industrial Characteristics 
(Million yen) 
Industries Numbers Amounts AP (Mean) AP (Maximum) TO (Mean) TO (Maximum) 
Manufacturing 
Food 16 362 1.11 2.35 1.50 2.88 
Textile 2 20 1.11 2.95 1.36 2.85 
Wood products/Paper 4 37 1.21 2.54 1.25 2.40 
Chemical/Drugs 24 813 1.67 3.09 1.91 3.74 
Glass/Ceramic 5 41 1.29 2.31 1.36 2.63 
Iron/No-ferrous metals/Fabricated metals 18 1,839 1.38 3.24 1.52 3.33 
General machinery 41 884 1.16 2.18 1.52 2.79 
Electrical machinery 85 3,769 1.38 3.58 1.53 3.20 
Transportation equipment ， 400 1.34 3.23 1.47 2.93 
Precision instruments 35 939 1.49 2.49 1.78 3.50 
Printing 2 98 0.97 2.05 1.32 2.79 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 41 798 1.64 2.68 1.34 2.38 
Non-manufacturing 
Housing/Construction 8 100 1.09 2.02 1.11 2.01 
Information service 7 140 0.98 2.38 1.67 3.00 
Software 41 1,756 0.98 2.38 1.67 3.00 
Retailing 11 741 1.22 1.77 1.53 3.00 
Services/Others 16 283 1.06 2.89 1.47 4.23 吋
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exhibitions. 
We derive the technological opportunity of industry in the same 
manner as the appropriability condition. First, we award 5 points to a 
"high" degree of effectiveness, 3 points to "medium", and 1 point to 
"low". Next, we calculate the average score of each type of 
technological opportunity. The average score is computed by the 
number of points times the percentage of respondent firms. Then, we 
obtain both the average and the maximum values of the average 
scores of the 15 types. These two values are defined as technological 
opportunity in an industry. 
Table 6 also shows the relationship between subsidies and 
technological opportunity. TO (Mean) and TO (Maximum) denote 
mean and maximum values of the effectiveness of the 15 
technological opportunities. 
Table 6 implies that the numbers of R&D subsidies are positively 
related to technological opportunity. This means that R&D subsidies 
tend to be awarded in the industry in which technological opportunity 
is relatively abundant. For example, the mean values of technological 
opportunity are 1.52 in electrical machinery, 1.53 in general 
machinery, 1.34 in miscellaneous manufacturing, 1.67 in software, 1.78 
in precision instruments, and 1.91 in chemical/drug industries. Without 
econometric analysis, it might be difficult to conclude that subsidy is 
positively related to technological opportunity. At this stage, however, 
we could point out that subsidies tend to be allocated to the industries 
with many technological opportunities. 
4. Conclusions 
We reported the actual situation of R&D subsidies in Japanese 
SMEs. We examined what type of firm is awarded R&D subsidies, 
taking into account endogeneuity problems. In addition, we considered 
the industries to which R&D subsidies are mainly allocated. In this 
case, we paid attention to industrial characteristics such as 
appropriability and technological opportunity. 
Simple analysis found no significant difference in the level of R&D 
between subsidized firms and non-subsidized firms. This suggests 
that endogeneuity problems are not so serious in our samples. o・n the 
79 
other hand, the allocation of subsidy in industries might be influenced 
by appropriability condition or technological opportunity. R&D subsidy 
tends to be distributed to industries in which appropriability is relatively 
effective, or technological opportunity is relatively abundant. 
We now briefly mention some issues that are beyond the scope of 
this paper. Simple analysis could not treat endogenous problems 
comprehensively. Therefore, the first issue is to examine endogeneuity 
problems more closely by employing econometric models. 
The second issue is the relationships among R&D subsidy and 
each appropriability condition 13. An interesting question is whether 
each appropriability condition equally affects the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies. 
The third issue is the relationships among R&D subsidy and each 
type of technological opportunity. Another interesting question is what 
type of technological opportunity is the most closely related to R&D 
subsidy. Investigation of this issue might be necessary to identify 
relationships between R&D subsidies and the knowledge transferred 
from, for example, universities. Upon identifying such relationships, 
we could examine whether R&D subsidies are effective tools for 
promoting knowledge transfer from universities to industries. 
In any case, there are stil many open questions relating to the role 
and the effect of R&D subsidy in innovative activities of Japanese 
SMEs. 
(Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics) 
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